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The consequences of the biggest environmental challenges, such as climate change and loss of 
biodiversity, are already here.1 Rapid, large-scaled actions are needed to tackle these problems. 
Intellectual property rights (IP, IPR) might not be the first remedy that comes to mind when 
considering these issues, but they certainly have their role in this context due to their impact 
on technological innovation and business. Indeed, the ability of the IP system to respond to 
societal expectations and needs broadly has attracted considerable attention recently.2 Despite 
the fact that IP law should  aim to reflect proportionality and to create a balance between the 
IP holders’ exclusive rights and other societal interests, several areas of IPR need to be 
improved in order for it to endorse a vision that goes beyond a ‘pure incentives-types’ of 
perspective. Copyright, patents and design rights should carry the ultimate goal of serving 
progress in a wider sense. Moreover, notwithstanding the traditional conception that trade 
marks are different in the sense that they are rather business tools par excellance, recent 
literature supports the view that also more ‘societal-type’ of values, with an increased emphasis 
on the consumers’ perspectives and needs, lie also behind the rationale for protecting trade 
marks.3 
 
Courts in Europe have also felt this desire in several occasions.4 On the one hand, these 
discussions have led to the inclusion of perspectives form other legal fields (like competition 
law and fundamental rights), as well as of interdisciplinary oriented perspectives, into the IP 
law discourse. On the other, despite the IPR system´s principal ability to recognise and take 
into account other societal interests, topics such as embedding fairness and ethics into IP are 
becoming increasingly important.5 One key element in this discourse relates to the importance 
of reflecting environmental sustainability into the IPR regime. 
                                               
1 About climate change, see for instance https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/; K. V. Wong, Climate Change (New 
York: Momentum Press, 2015), Ch. 6. About biodiversity loss, see for instance P. Raven, “The Epic of 
Evolution and the Problem of the Biodiversity Loss” in Biodiversity & the Law. Intellectual Property, 
Biotechnology and Traditional Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 27–33.  
2 See, for instance, R.M. Ballardini and T. Pihlajarinne, “Intellectual Property Rights, Technology and the 
Environment: Academic Prospectives on Fostering Sustainable Innovation” (2019) 1/2019 NIR (Nordiskt 
Immateriellt Rättskydd) 152–155. 
3 See, for instance, K. Weckström, A Contextual Approach to Limits in EU Trade Mark Law, (Helsinki: 
Publications of the IPR University Center 8, 2011). 
4 For several examples, see for e.g A. Tizzano, “The Role of the ECJ in the Protection of Fundamental Rights” 
in Continuity and Change in EU law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 125–138. 
5 For other examples, see Adam D. Moore, “Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Social Progress: The Case 
Against Incentive-Based Arguments” (2003) Vol 26 The Hamline Law Review 601–630, (“Hopefully, upon 
recognized the difficulties that infect rule-utilitarian intellectual property, we may begin to move away from our 
current system—a system that views intellectual property rights as state-created entities—and toward 
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Until recent years, environmental issues have been confined into the field of public areas of 
law, such as environmental law and energy law, where several legislative and policy actions 
have been taken at national, regional, as well as global levels. Private law, on the other hand, 
has received little attention. Gradually, however, sustainability has started to be perceived as a 
broader issue, that should not only touch upon those fields of law that have most direct 
relevance to it.6 Instead, environmental sustainability is now conceived more holistically, as a 
policy or even a fundamental right that demands integration inter alia into all or most areas of 
law. Considering the key role that private law (especially IP law) plays in fostering 
technological innovation and creativity, as well as in regulating business, there is an urgent 
need for assessing the ability of this legal field to better embrace environmental sustainability, 
this way propagating a fair distribution of environmental benefits and burdens widely.  
 
This article explores the emerging need for embedding environmental sustainability into the 
European IP law system by focusing on few important examples. The perspective stems from 
two core planetary boundaries, namely climate change and biosphere integrity. We begin with 
a general discourse on the role of sustainability in European IP law observing that it is evident 
that IPR laws in Europe should more explicitly reflect such value. We then turn to the current 
IP system in search for a place for sustainability. First, we shed light over how the way that the 
scope of protection and the concept of IP ownership are currently understood does not give 
space for including sustainability. Instead, we argue that, at the moment, societal values, in 
general, are primarily incorporated into the IPR regime indirectly as part of general 
argumentation on competition, or only as singular, narrow exceptions to strong property rights 
as a main rule. In this context, we then focus on the principle of exhaustion, and some other 
limitations that are closely related to it, using it as a key example to show how trying to embed 
societal values, like sustainability, only as an exception to the main rule, is actually untenable.  
 
To support our claim we make use of two concrete scenarios, namely the sharing and the 
circular economies, where IPR could allegedly be a major driver in the path towards promoting 
sustainable innovation and business models. We shed light over major reasons for why 
sustainability could face insurmountable obstacles if being channeled into the IPR framework 
only or primarily via the exhaustion door or via other exceptions and limitations. Instead, we 
develop recommendations for how environmental sustainability could be better considered 
directly into the scope of the exclusive rights, this way clearly aligning IP rights with the 
planetary boundaries as enforced in the limits set by sustainability. 
 
                                               
institutions that acknowledge and uphold the natural rights of authors and inventors.”) (emphasis in original); 
Alina Ng Boyte, “Finding Copyright’s Core Content” (2013) 10(3) U. St. Thomas L.J. 774, 775; David 
Opderbeck, “Beyond Bits, Memes, and Utility Machines: A Theory of Intellectual Property as Social Relations” 
(2013) 10(3) U. St. Thomas L.J. 738–773. 
6 For instance, in 2014 sustainability was assessed as being located “in a periphery of mainstream regulation”. It 
has taken time to start integrating sustainability-related concepts even in environmental and public health 
regulation and great efforts are needed in other areas of law. See T. F. Malloy, “Design for Regulation: 
Integrating Sustainable Production into Mainstream Regulation” in Law and the Transition to Business 
Sustainability (Cham: Springer, 2014), p. 3, 20, pp. 1–23. 
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2. What Should be the Place for Sustainability in the European IP system? 
  
The concept of ‘sustainable development’ originates from the Report of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development (WCED) of 1987, where it was defined as “development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs”. In the WCED, it was also stated that sustainable development is “a 
process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the 
orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with 
future as well as present needs.”7 Sustainability is usually defined through interconnected 
pillars that include a wide variety of environmental, economic and social issues. For instance, 
the environmental pillar refers to the protection of environmental resources to present and 
future generations.8 Sustainability is also defined as the social foundation for humanity within 
‘planetary boundaries’9, including core issues such as climate change and biodiversity.  
Moreover, recently, a division has arisen between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ sustainability: while 
weak sustainability brings environmental concerns into the existing structures and systems of 
business, strong sustainability aims at integrating business into environmental systems by 
challenging existing structures so that the industrial activities would actually fit within the 
capacity of the Planet.10  
 
According to Article 3(3) of the Treaty on the of the European Union (TEU) the EU shall work 
for the ‘sustainable development’ of Europe. This goal specifically includes a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. Moreover, according to Article 
11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) environmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of Union’s policies and 
activities. This seems to indicate that such requirements shall be reflected  in all fields of EU 
regulation.11 Indeed, this environmental integration obligation must be balanced with 
protection of property and intellectual property protection referred in Articles 36 and 118 of 
the TFEU.12 This notwithstanding, however, while the EU strongly supports the UN 
                                               
7 United Nations World Commission Report on Environment and Development Our Common Future. Available 
in: https://www.are.admin.ch/are/en/home/sustainable-development/international-cooperation/2030agenda/un-
_-milestones-in-sustainable-development/1987--brundtland-report.html (Accessed 14th May 2019).  
8 E. Rodrigues, The General Exception Clauses of the TRIPS Agreement. Promoting Sustainable Development 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 1‒2. 
9 See Johan Rockström, “Planetary Boundaries: exploring the safe operating space for humanity” (2009) 14(2) 
Ecology and Society. See also Beate Sjåfjell, Jukka Mähönen, Adrew Johnston and Jay Cullen, “Obstacles to 
Sustainable Global Business. Towards EU Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development” SMART Project 
(2019) University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research paper No 2019-02 pp. 16–18 (On file with the authors). 
10 N. Roome, “Looking Back, Thinking Forward: Distinguishing Between Weak and Strong Sustainability” in 
The Oxford Handbook of Business and the Natural Environment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 
620, pp. 620  ̶629. 
11 See also B. Sjåfjell and A. Wiesbrock, “The importance of art. 11 TFEU for regulating business in the EU 
Securing the very basis of our existence” in The Greening of European Business under EU law. Taking Article 
11 TFEU Seriously (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 1, pp. 1–12. 
12 See also TFEU art. 4.3, which states that in the areas of research, technological development and space, the 
Union shall have competence to carry out activities.  
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Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)13, policy coherence and a holistic evidence-based 
approach for achieving sustainability within the IPR framework is still missing in the EU 
framework.14 
 
As above-mentioned, the crossroads of IPR and sustainability has gradually started to provoke 
explicit discussion over the last decade. Certainly, the relationship between IPR and human 
rights as a part of social sustainability is nothing new. However, environmental sustainability 
is a rather fresh perspective in the IPR context. On the one hand, the discourse around IP law 
and sustainable development has, thus far, mostly focused on issues related to international 
trade and within the context of international agreements, such as the TRIPs Agreement, where 
a range of views about international IPR regimes has emerged to highlight the cost-benefit 
balance between developed and developing countries.15 On the other, however, the impact of 
the IP regime on the development and deployment of sustainable innovations has not attracted 
great attention.16 
 
The relationship between IPR and environmental sustainability is not straightforward neither 
in the formulation nor in the application of the European IPR regulation. It could be argued 
that the fundamental theories of justification of IPR are in line with the general idea of 
sustainability. For instance, according to most utilitarian and Lockean theories the purpose of 
IPR is to encourage the production of intangible assets, reward and acknowledge those who 
have contributed to the proliferation of such assets, and safeguard collective cultural benefits, 
fostering sustainable welfare.17 On the other hand, however, a balance needs to be sought 
between providing incentives and guaranteeing access.18 Moreover, the principle of 
proportionality, that is the requirement that exclusive rights should be proportionate to the 
value or importance of the protected subject matter, also supports the idea of sustainability 
having a visible role in the IPR system.  
 
                                               
13 See UN, Sustainable Development Goals, Available in: 
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/ (accessed 31st May 2019) 
14 B. Sjåfjell et al., Obstacles to Sustainable Global Business. Towards EU Policy Coherence for Sustainable 
Development. 
15 For instance, see R. Meléndez-Ortiz and P. Roffe, Intellectual Property and Sustainable Development, 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009) and Rodrigues, The General Exception Clauses of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Promoting Sustainable Development.  
16 Rimmer, amongst the few, discusses some core issues from the perspective of international trade, 
organisations and agreements, related to the role of IP for climate change and clean energy. See M. Rimmer, 
Intellectual Property and Climate Change: Inventing Clean Technologies (Intellectual Property and the 
Environment), (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) and M. Rimmer, Intellectual Property and Clean 
Energy. The Paris Agreement and Climate Justice, 1st edn (Singopore: Springer, 2018). Moreover, the interplay 
between IPRs and climate change is analyzed in, for instance J. Sarnoff, Research handbook on Intellectual 
Property and Climate Change (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016).  
17 See, for instance, G. Van Overwalle, “Smart Innovation and inclusive patents for sustainable food and health 
care: Redefining the Europe 2020 objectives” in Constructing European Intellectual Property. Achievements 
and new Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), p. 231, p. 250, pp. 231–254. 
18 For information about general theories for justifying IPR see: Justin Hughes, “The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property” (1988) 77(2) Geo. L.J. 287–366. Also other justifications than utilitarian theories for IPR exist, 
especially those drawn from a Locke's "theory of property”, see: John Locke, Two Treaties of Government 
(1690), P. Laslett, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, Second Treatise, Sec. 27. 
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Despite these general starting points, however, it seems that the IPR regime fails in fully 
recognising sustainability for two main reasons. First, the strong ‘property rights approach’, 
which has traditionally been followed in Europe and is reflected in many of the current 
structures of the European IPR framework, hinders the sustainability perspective to be 
genuinely taken seriously.  Second, under the current rules, the principle of proportionality 
seems to open the door for the weighing and balancing between the exclusive rights and, for 
instance, general arguments on free competition and efficient markets, but not sustainability. 
This might not be enough for creating the regulatory mechanisms needed in the struggle against 
the environmental challenge. In fact, this setting makes it difficult for sustainability arguments 
to override the traditional IPR justifications of providing incentives. Indeed, a ‘strong property 
rights’ approach might create barriers towards promoting sustainable innovations and business 
models. Under the current economic, incentive- and exclusion-based approach to intellectual 
property, public interests, like sustainability, are often taken for granted, with noneconomic 
values ignored or subordinated to private economic interests. 
 
3. Scope of IPR Protection and the Invisible Link to Sustainability  
 
The claims above exposed are reflected into several structures of the current IPR framework in 
Europe. From the point of view of scope of protection and ownership, as well as scope of 
exclusive rights, some considerations are devoted to the role of societal values in the European 
IP regimes. For instance, according to Article 53 of the European Patent Convention19, as well 
as Article 6(1) of the EU Biotechnology Directive20, inventions shall be considered 
unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or 
morality. In copyright law, freedom of speech as a fundamental societal value is reflected into 
the scope of protection. Furthermore, for instance Art 3 (b) of the Infosoc Directive21 provides 
an example of human rights-based exception: the article allows member states to adopt 
exceptions for the benefit of people with a disability. Also in the trademark regime trademarks 
which are contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of morality constitute reasons for 
absolute grounds for refusal or invalidity.22  
 
Although public policy and morality are meant to be open legal concepts to provide an entrance 
door for fundamental rights, thus allowing possibilities for taking into account ethical values 
when defining the content and scope of intellectual property rights, these concepts are often 
interpreted narrowly. For instance in the context of patent law, the EPO Guidelines for 
examination affirms that, on the one hand, “the purpose of this is to deny protection to 
                                               
19 The European Patent Convention, 16th Edition/June 2016. Available at: https://www.epo.org/law-
practice/legal-texts/epc.html (accessed on 3rd May 2019). 
20 Directive 98/44 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions [1998] OJ L 213. Available at: 
https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31998L0044:EN:HTML(accessed on 3rd May 
2019).  
21 Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society [2001] OJ L 167 (InfoSoc Directive). 
22 See for e.g. Directive 2015/2436 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] 
OJ L 336 (TMD) art. 4 and EU Regulation 2015/2424 amending Council Regulation 207/2009 on the 
Community trade mark and Commission Regulation 2868/95 [2015] OJ L 341 (TMR) art. 7.  
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inventions likely to induce riot or public disorder, or to lead to criminal or other generally 
offensive behaviour” only. For example, the provision have thus far been applied only to the 
context of biotechnologies, such as stem cells research and gene-related technologies, where 
ethical issues related to the manipulation of human and lifes has emerged at several occasions23, 
or in relation to inventions likely to induce riot or public disorder, or to lead to criminal or other 
generally offensive behaviour. On the other hand, the Guidelines themselves explicitly state 
that “this provision is likely to be invoked only in rare and extreme cases”.24 Similarly, in the 
case of trade mark “public policy” or “accepted principles of morality” have, thus far, been 
interpreted accordingly to the EUIPO guidelines as sings like those which consist of names of 
individuals or groups connected with terrorism25 , dishonest signs or sings instigating racial, 
political or religious intolerance, sings which promote violence, racisms, crimes, as well as 
signs which consist of the symbols and names of unconstitutional parties or organizations 
which are prohibited in Germany and in Austria and symbols of totalitarianism and pejorative, 
discriminatory, indecent and vulgar signs, if so-called reasonable person with normal levels of 
sensitivity and tolerance would feel that.26 
 
All this indicates that not only the European IPR legislation hardly contains explicit remarks 
on environmental sustainability, but also that arguments related to environmental sustainability 
have not even yet been presented nor thoroughly discussed in court decisions in Europe. Some, 
although quite limited efforts, have been pulled forth in national and international policies, 
particularly in the context of patent laws, to promote ‘green’ types of technological innovations. 
For instance, a number of national IP offices have put in place measures to fast-track ‘green’ 
patent applications, under which the time needed to obtain a patent can be significantly reduced 
(from several years to just a few months).27 However, these attempts are quite limited and too 
specific for being able to genuinely foster sustainability values into IPR.  
 
Overall, it can be quite confidently argued that the current IP system relies heavily on 
exceptions and limitations as a balancing mechanism between protection and other societal 
interests. Thus, exceptions and limitations are usually the main source where societal related 
arguments are confined. As previously mentioned, however, notwithstanding the importance 
of exceptions and limitations for this purpose, the downside of this approach is that it might 
                                               
23 See for e.g. Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace E.V. (C-34/10) EU:C:2011:669; [2011]; Onco-Mouse (T 0019/90) 
EP:BA:1990:T001990; [1990]; Relaxin/Howard Florey Institute (T 0272/95) EP:BA:2002:T027295; [2002] at 
[4], [6]–[7]; cf. Howard Florey/Relaxin [1995] EPOR 541; Cf. Breast and ovarian cancer/UNIVERSITY OF 
UTAH (T 1213/05) EP:BA:2007:T121305; [2007]; Mutation/UNIVERSITY OF UTAH (T 0666/05) 
EP:BA:2008:T066605; [2008] and Method of diagnosis/UNIVERSITY OF UTAH (T 0080/05) 
EP:BA:2008:T008005; [2008]. 
24 See EPO Guidelines for examination Part G-II, 4.1. Available at: https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/html/guidelines/e/g_ii_4_1.html (accessed 31st May 2019).  
25 In accordance to the Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat 
terrorism [2001] OJ L 344 adopted by the Council of the EU. 
26 EUIPO Guidelines for Trade mark, Part B, Section 4, Chs 7 and 9. Available at: 
https://euipo01app.sdlproducts.com/1004922/903898/trade-mark-guidelines/section-4-absolute-grounds-for-
refusal (accessed on 3rd May 2019).  
27 The first program was established by the UK in May 2009, followed by Australia, Israel, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea (ROK) and the US. Later, also Canada (in March 2011), Brazil and China (in 2012) launched similar 
programs.   
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cause a strong property right approach to prevail over other important societal interests. First, 
as shown already in multiple occasions, such an approach leads to difficulties in implementing 
new exceptions and limitations when new societal needs emerge. Second, even when 
implemented, they tend to be formulated narrowly. In other words, conceiving sustainability 
as a negative variable, i.e. as an exception to the main rule, does not enable the goals of a 
‘strong’ sustainability approach.  
 
The next session considers two key case studies related to sustainable innovation and 
sustainable practices, that is the case of the sharing economy and the case of the circular 
economy. These cases are used to shed light over areas where the existing IP framework in 
Europe is currently creating obstacles for promoting and reflecting environmental 
sustainability values in IPR protected technological developments and deployments. Special 
attention is posed on the principle of exhaustion, which seems to be the place where major 
obstacles to reflect ‘strong’ sustainability into the IP framework arises. The purpose for using 
these examples is twofold. On the one hand, we aim at illustrating how the current IP system 
does not fully embed sustainability, while on the other, we demonstrate that a narrow-approach 
that addresses environmental sustainability concerns only from the perspective of exceptions 
and limitations is unsuitable for fostering ‘strong’ sustainability. A holistic, bottom-up 
approach is instead necessary.   
 
4. Sharing and Circular Economy Models to Foster Sustainable Innovation 
4.1 The relationship between sharing and Circular Economy models and IPRs 
 
Concepts like the sharing economy (SE) and the circular economy (CE) have nowadays 
evolved and spread to various market sectors. Both structures are part of a movement that 
encompasses several models for promoting wiser uses of resources and more sustainable 
business models. Both the SE and the CE, in fact, hold promises for providing with new ways 
of increasing economic benefits, while offering services that could save energy, reduce waste 
and bring communities together by sharing their resources and time. 
 
The concept of the SE encompasses various activities whereby resources, such as products and 
personal items, are made accessible for others to use, typically in or via the online 
environment.28 The SE promotes collective utilisation, access, and reuse of (existing) resources 
rather than sole ownership and production of new items, while building on peer networking 
and collaboration. The CE, instead, is a new industrial model that aims to reduce waste and 
optimize the use of resources. The CE focuses on inter alia ‘reuse, repair, recycle, eco-design, 
sustainable supply and responsible consumption’, as opposed to a linear model of consumption 
based on a ‘take, make, waste’ philosophy.29 
 
                                               
28 See definition provided by the European Commission on “Collaborative Economy”. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/services/collaborative-economy_en. 
29 D. Gaullard and L. Blandine, Circular Economy, Industrial Ecology and Short Supply Chain: Towards 
Sustainable Territories (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2016), Vol. 4, p. 1.  
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Reaching the goals of both the SE and the CE heavily depends on decisions and choices by 
legislators, policymakers and business entities.30 The IPR system may play a crucial role in 
providing the right incentives for accelerating developments and diffusion of the innovations 
needed to meet the desirable effects of the SE and the CE. Yet, challenges exist under the 
current system that impose obstacles and should be tackled accordingly. Amongst these, the 
principle of exhaustion represents a major one.    
 
The current European legal system, in general, and the IPR regime especially, tend to promote 
a model where access to goods (and services) is based on linear models of consumption and 
ownership, which are often not in line with the requirements and principles of neither the 
sharing nor the circular economies.31 Indeed, the fact that both the SE and the CE rely on the 
acts of repairing and reusing -instead of purchasing new-, sharing and lending -instead of 
owning-, and recycling -instead of disposing- might actually collide with several of the 
restrictive acts forbidden by IPR. For instance, copyright law forbids, amongst others, 
possibilities for copying, making available to the public, and distributing protected works, 
while patent rights do not allow third parties to use, re-use or make copies of the patented 
invention. Trade mark rights create a rather extensive exclusive right to forbid others to utilise 
a trade mark in commerce.  
 
In principle, large part of those activities could be allowed by the doctrine of exhaustion. The 
principle of exhaustion limits the extent to which IPR holders can enforce their rights on a sold 
protected product after it has entered the market with the right holder’s consent. It is important 
to note that exhaustion never concerns IPR in a certain good, but rather applies to a copy of 
that specific good sold by or with the consent of the right holder. Moreover, traditionally, it has 
been argued that exhaustion only concerns physical objects of protected products, while does 
not apply to services.32 The principle of exhaustion exists in all EU countries, although in 
different forms, such as through statutory provisions or case law interpretations. Theoretically, 
this principle plays a key role in enabling possibilities for sharing, reusing, repairing and 
recycling protected goods in both a SE and a CE context: as the copy of the sold good is no 
more protected by IPR, it can be shared, distributed, as well as used, re-used and repaired 
without the proprietor’s consent. This notwithstanding, however, the application of the 
exhaustion principle in the settings conceived by both the SE and the CE becomes problematic 
                                               
30 Mateusz Lewandowski, “Designing the Business Models for Circular Economy –Towards the Conceptual 
Framework” (2016) Sustainability 8(1). Available at: http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/8/1/43 (accessed 31st 
May 2019). 
31 Mähönen points out that at the same time, short-term oriented legal systems often support linear models of 
consumption, which are not necessarily in line with the requirements of the circular economy, Jukka Mähönen 
“Financing Sustainable Market Actors in Circular Economy” (2018) University of Oslo Faculty of Law 
Research Paper No 2018-28 1. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273263 (accessed 31st May 
2019). 
32 See InfoSoc Directive recitals (28) and (29) and art. 4(1), a formulation of which demonstrates that 
distribution was meant to cover only transfer of ownership of tangible copies. See also Ulla-Maija Mylly, 
“Patents and Computer Program Interoperability in Europe. Are the Exceptions in Current Patent Laws and the 
Proposed Unitary Patent Protection Sufficient?” (2012) Vol 81(4) Nordiskt Immateriellt Rättskydd (NIR) 375–
402 and Anna Haapanen, Free and Open Source Software Licensing and the Mystery of Licensor’s Patents, 
(University of Helsinki, 2017). Available at: https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/177034 (accessed on 3rd 
May 2019).  
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from multiple angles, as the rights conferred by, for instance, copyright, patents, trade marks 
and design rights are often interpreted widely and commercial activities targeted at sharing, 
reusing, repairing and recycling protected products are easily considered as prima facie 
infringements.  
 
4.2. Patents: Repairing versus Reconstructing 
 
In patent law, as with other IPR, once a patented product is put into the market with the 
authorization of the patentee, the patentee no longer has any enforceable right to control the 
subsequent resale, importation or use of that same physical item within the domestic market.33 
In other words, the purchaser’s right to use is supported by the exhaustion doctrine. From the 
SE and CE perspective, the most essential feature in the exhaustion principle is drawing a line 
between (permissible) repair and (unpermissible) reconstruction of a patent protected item. In 
fact, even though the loan and ordinary repair of the product are covered by the exhaustion 
principle, such ordinary repair (including maintenance) is allowed only insofar as it does not 
equate to ‘making’ the invention. The distinction between ‘making’ versus ‘repairing’, 
however, is not straightforward. Although making copies of someone else’s patented invention 
is an infringement, it is not clear whether and to what extent purchasing a patented item and 
subsequently modifying it or repairing it is allowed. For instance, whether repairing a patented 
product by replacing parts of it qualifies as ‘ordinary’ repair, or constitutes instead ‘making’ 
the invention and, as such, infringing upon the rights of the patentee is a question that often 
needs to be addressed on a case-by-case situation. The difficulties in distinguishing between 
repairing and making, become more complex when it comes to patented products that need to 
be refilled, giving third parties the opportunity to provide substitutes for parts of the patented 
invention alongside refills.34 Arguably, these could be common situations where sustainability 
arguments could be raised. 
 
Generally speaking, there is no real agreement on the interpretation of ‘repair’ in the EU35. The 
notion of ‘repair’ is not mentioned in any patent statute in Europe and national case law on the 
issue is scarce. Overall, the factors that are usually taken into consideration by European courts 
when deciding on issues of ‘making’ as opposed to ‘repairing’ patented products include: 
(1) Whether and to what extent the technical effects of the invention are embodied by 
the component replaced. In other words, does the part in question form part of the inventive 
character of the product and, as such, reflect the technical effects of the patent? 
                                               
33 See, for instance, Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPC Agreement) [2013] OJ C 175 art. 29. 
34 See R.M. Ballardini, M. Norrgård and T. Minssen, “Enforcing Patents in the Era of 3D Printing” (2015) 
10(11) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 850–866. 
35 UPC agreement art. 29 contains a provision on exhaustion. It is possible that the details of exhaustion will be 
harmonized in the practice of the Unified Patent Court. However, even if this project will ultimately succeed, 
this is only a partial solution due to the fact that defendants might still face claims for infringement of national 
patents. 
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(2) The need for repair of the product (estimated with respect to the normal working 
life of the device). For instance, was the spare part in question expected to be replaced during 
the normal working life of the product? 
(3) The extent of the repair compared with the manufacturing process of the original 
product. Do the measures taken to repair the patented product maintain its identity as it was 
entered into the market, or do they equate to creating a new product? 
(4) The extent to which the repaired part competes with the original parts.36 
This notwithstanding, however, the concept of permissible ‘repair’ is interpreted with 
differences in the EU MS. In fact, different European courts have disagreed on whether and to 
what extent producing, transforming, assembling or even building a product is legitimate (i.e. 
whether it counts as ‘ordinary’ repair or not). Indeed, it could be possible that the national 
interpretations might be favourable for right holders, this way possibly contradicting the aims 
of modern SE and CE thinking.37 The threshold of “normal working lifespan”, that is currently 
considered as the basis for allowing repairs of a protected product, for instance, might lead to 
unbalanced results when considering recycling activities. This is because ‘unsustainable’, 
short-life-span and not-renewable goods might be considered as normal in society. Moreover, 
patent holders way of, for instance, marketing, presenting or planning the product might impact 
on how the consumers perceive the product´s lifespan. 38 
 
4.3. Design Rights, Alterations and Repairing Spares  
 
Design rights, which have been extensively harmonised in the EU39, cover  the exclusive right 
to use a protected design, “in particular, the making, offering, putting on the market, importing, 
exporting or using of a product in which the design is incorporated or to which it is applied, or 
stocking such a product for those purposes”40. Although exhaustion of the protected design 
occurs when a product has been put on the market in the EU by the rightholder or with their 
                                               
36 See, for instance, United Wire Ltd v Screen Repair Services (Scotland) Ltd  F.S.R. 24 HL [2001]; Schütz (UK) 
Ltd v Werit (UK) Ltd (Rev 1) [2013] UKSC 16 (13 March 2013); BGH 14.07.1970, GRUR 1971, 78, 80 
Diarähmchen V, BGH 17.07.2012, docket no. X ZR 97/11 Palettenbehälter II, available in German at: 
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&sid=3c6d49f845d
cefd695bb195c4e4722bb&nr=61447&pos=0&anz=1. See the English translation in IIC, Pallet Container II 
(Palettenbehälter II) (2013) 44 at 351–360, 351, DOI 10.1007/s40319-013-0044-3; Trommeleinheit [Drum Unit] 
– court docket: X ZR 55/16, GRUR-Prax 2018, 50 of the 24th of October 2017. 
37 See R.M. Ballardini, I. Flores-Ituarte and E. Pei, “Printing Spare Parts Through Additive Manufacturing: 
Legal and Digital Business Challenges” (2018) 29(6) Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management 958–
982; T. Pihlajarinne, “Repairing and Re-using from an Exclusive Rights Perspective – Towards Sustainable 
Lifespan as Part of a New Normal?” in IP and Sustainable Markets (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2020, 
forthcoming); R.M. Ballardini and A. Alen-Savikko, “IPR and the Sharing Economy” in Jakamistalous-
Juridiikka (Helsinki: Alma Talent, 2019), pp. 381–408. 
38 See more detailed, T. Pihlajarinne, “Repairing and Re-using from an Exclusive Rights Perspective – Towards 
Sustainable Lifespan as Part of a New Normal?”. 
39 See Directive 98/71 on the legal protection of designs [1998] OJ L 289 (DD) and European Council 
Regulation 6/2002 on Community designs [2002] OJ L 3 (DR). 
40 See DD art. 12 and DR art. 19. 
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consent41, alterations of the original product are usually not allowed.42 This makes it possible 
for rightholders to control over CE and SE related activities, which typically require alterations 
of products.  
 
A key example in the context of the SE and the CE relates to the possibility to use and repair 
spare parts covered by design rights. Issues related to protection of repairing spares in context 
of complex products, like cars, has been highly debated and controversial in the EU. Both the 
Design Directive and the Regulation confer protection for complex products “composed of 
multiple components which can be replaced permitting disassembly and re-assembly of the 
product”43. Article 110.1 (the so called ‘repair clause’) of the Design Regulation excludes 
replacement parts and accessories (so called ‘must-match’ parts) from design protection, to the 
extent that they are used to restore the original appearance of the product. This repair clause 
was designed to enable independent manufacturers to provide customers with spare parts for 
repair purposes at cost-effective prices by freeing them from potential infringement claims. 
Indeed, many manufacturers (especially in the car industry) have fought against this provision, 
as they considered it to be a weakening of their IP rights. In addition, it has been a matter of 
some debate which elements of a car are even covered by the clause; for example, does it 
include accessories, such as wheel rims?  
 
The CJEU have recently clarified that the scope of the repair clause is not limited to 
components whose shape is determined by the appearance of the complex product. This is good 
news, as it means that the repair clause covers all spare parts  regardless the shape.44 At the 
same time, however, the Court added that the clause is only applicable when the repair “serves 
to restore the original appearance” (“visually identical”). This interpretation might impede 
some of the CE or SE -related acts. On the other hand, a positive aspect from CE and SE 
perspectives is that  the concept of ‘use’ should be interpreted broadly and is to include all 
forms of use of a part for repair purposes, such as: “the making, offering, putting on the market, 
importing, exporting or using of a product in which the design is incorporated or to which it is 
applied, or stocking such a product for those purposes”45. Lastly, a person who invokes the 
repair clause is under a duty of care to ensure that ‘downstream users’ act in compliance with 
the requirements of the repair clause, although the manufacturer or seller of a component of a 
complex product is not obliged to objectively guarantee that end users ultimately act in 
complete compliance with the outlined conditions.46 
 
                                               
41 See the European Design Directive art. 15. 
42 For instance, in BGH 1-ZR 89/08 Verlangarete Limousinen a company had acquired Daimler cars and 
widened them by adding a section in the middle. The ad put them on the market. The Bundesgerichtshof 
concluded that the exhaustion doctrine was not applicable because the product clearly deviate from the standard 
version cars that the rightholder had put on the market. 
43 See DD art. 1(c) and DR art. 3(c). 
44 See Acacia Srl v Pneusgarda Srl and Audi AG and Acacia Srl and Rolando D'Amato v Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche 
AG (C-397/16) EU:C:2017:992; [2017]. 
45 DD art. 12 and DR art. 19. 
46 For further details see eg. Jane Cornwell, “Nintendo vs BigBen and Acacia vs Audi; Acacia vs Porsche: 
Design Exceptions at the CJEU” (2019) 14(1) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 51–61. Available 
at: https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpy116 (accessed 31 May 2019). 
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Notwithstanding these possibilities allowed by the Regulation, however, there is no similar 
clause in the Directive. Article 14 of the Design Directive (so called “freeze plus -provision”) 
states that “Member States shall maintain in force their existing legal provisions relating to the 
use of the design of a component part used for the purpose of the repair of a complex product 
so as to restore its original appearance and shall introduce changes to those provisions only if 
the purpose is to liberalise the market for such parts”. This provision represented a compromise 
and it was aimed to be in force only until the Commission would make a proposal for 
amendments.  At the same time, Article 18 stated that a review shall be made by the 
Commission on the spare parts provision. The review, conducted in 2004 stated that it was the 
right time to adopt a clause that would make it possible for others than rightholders to supply 
a replacement part using an identical design. 47 However, there has been no progress after that 
and the proposal was withdrawn in 2014. The outcome is the lack of harmonisation of this 
issue48 and the fact that in many member states (for instance, in Germany) repair activities are 
impeded by the fact that the national law and / or case law do not offer possibilities to  use 
unauthorised spares.  
 
4.4. Copyright: Sharing, Reusing and Lending 
 
Generally speaking, the digital environment has shown to have great potential to expand the 
scope of copyright protection. For instance, due to the easiness of digital copying, very many 
actions are potentially copyright infringements because of the broad interpretation of the 
concept of reproduction.49 The combination of extensive rights and narrow exceptions and 
limitations in relation to activities, like reproduction, that are essential to CE and SE activities, 
does not support sustainable business models and activities. 
Article 4 of the InfoSoc Directive regulates the exhaustion of the distribution right of the 
copyright holders “where the first sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that 
object is made by the rightholder or with his consent”. Moreover, the exhaustion of the 
exclusive right of distribution is regulated in the Software Directive50 Art. 4(2) (in relation to 
software works), the Database Directive51 Article 5 (for database works), as well as in the 
                                               
47 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 98/71/EC on the legal protection of designs (SEC(2004) 1097) 
COM(2004) 0582 final-COD 2004/0203. 
48 There is a fundamental difference in arguments that are favor and against such a clause in the way of how 
IPRs aim is seen in primary and secondary markets. See D. Beldiman and C. Blanke-Roeser, “European Design 
Law: Considerations Relating to Protection of Spare Parts for Restoring a Complex Product's Original 
Appearance” (2015) 46(8) IIC 915–919. 
49 The act of reproduction is regulated, for e.g. in the InfoSoc Directive arts 2 and 5. These articles have been 
interpreted in various occasions. For instance, in the case Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades 
Forening (C-5/08) EU:C:2009:465; [2009] decision, the CJEU decided that an act consisted of storing an extract 
of a protected work comprising 11 words and printing out that extract, was an act of reproduction. For more 
details, see also T. Pihlajarinne, “Non-traditional Trademark Infringements” in 3D Printing, Intellectual 
Property and Innovation. Insights from Law and Technology (Apphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 
2017), 303–316. 
50 Directive 2009/24 on the legal protection of computer programs [2009] OJ L 111. 
51 Directive 96/9 on the legal protection of databases [1996] OJ L 77 (Database Directive). 
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Rental and Lending Directive52 Article 9 (in relation to rental and lending of originals and 
copies of copyright works).  
 
One major case interpreting exhaustion in copyright in the EU is UsedSoft53, where the CJEU 
had to answer the question whether or not the distribution right of a computer program was 
exhausted according to Software Directive Article 4(2), if the buyer has himself made the copy 
after having downloaded the program via the Internet. Focusing on the material copy that 
resulted after the download, rather than on the act of offering the program for downloading, the 
CJEU held that the distribution right with regard to that particular copy is exhausted, as far as 
the copyright holder had conferred a right to use that copy for an unlimited period of time. The 
court concluded that in these circumstances, this was a de facto transfer of ownership. This 
interpretation was, however, limited to the holding of the Software Directive. In the follow-up 
the case Art & Allposters C-419/13 the court further expanded the interpretation of the 
exhaustion doctrine to works that go beyond software and concluded that the applicability of 
the principle of exhaustion depends on “whether the altered object itself, taken as a whole, is 
physically the object that was placed onto the market with a consent of a rightholder”.54 In the 
case, the medium was altered, as the paper-based copies were transferred into a form of canvas. 
The case demonstrates the traditional principle followed in copyright exhaustion according to 
which the physical transformation due to which the work is, as whole, considered as a new 
object, prevents the application of the exhaustion doctrine.55 Indeed, one could interpret the 
decision as a guideline that reselling other digital content then software, is likely not subject to 
exhaustion.56 This sets a narrow space for many acts in a SE or CE based society, where in 
essence of which are often alterations are often necessary in order to lengthen thea lifespan of 
the work or to make the work more usable.  This aspect is relevant both in the digital and the 
analogue environment, for instance when considering repair activities targeted at items of 
applied art or digital transformations. At the same time, however, especially in view of the 
Microsoft decision57, it remains particularly unclear whether and to what extent the UsedSoft’s 
conclusion can be extended to works other than computer programs and that fall under the 
scope of the InfoSoc Directive. For instance, Mezei notes that one remarkable difference 
between the software Directive and the Infosoc Directive is that, when considering exhaustion, 
the software Directive does not make a difference between tangible and intangible copies. In 
contrast, according to the Infosoc Directive, only intangible copies are applied under the 
doctrine. However, it should not be the subject matter, i.e. the work type, that is decisive, but 
                                               
52 Directive 2006/115 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of 
intellectual property [2006] OJ L 376. 
53 UsedSoft v. Oracle International (C-128/11) EU:C:2012:407; [2012]. 
54 Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright (C-419/13) EU:C:2015:27; [2015]. 
55 Similarly P. Mezei, Copyright Exhaustion, Law and Policy in the United States and the European Union 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 48–49 and Toby Headdon, “The Allposters problem: 
Reproduction, Alteration and the Misappropriation of Value” (2018) 40(8) European Intellectual Property 
Review 501, 503, pp. 501–509.  
56 Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright (C-419/13) EU:C:2015:27; [2015]. 
57 Aleksandrs Ranks and Jurijs Vasiļevičs v Finanšu un ekonomisko noziegumu izmeklēšanas prokoratūra and 
Microsoft Corp (Case C-166/15) EU:C:2016:762; [2016]. 
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whether the work is distributed in a tangible or intangible medium. In that respect, for instance, 
Mezei makes an argument that the UsedSoft decision violates international copyright treaties.58  
 
As previously mentioned, both the SE and the CE aim at promoting collective utilisation, 
access, and reuse of (existing) resources rather than sole ownership and production of new 
items, while building on peer networking and collaboration.59 In principle, developing business 
models around these types of activities is expected to be more sustainable and environmentally-
friendly. At the same time, however, the alleged narrow interpretation as to what extent the 
exhaustion principle applies in regard to distribution of copyright protected works imposes 
clear obstacles for such business models to arise. On the one hand, a large part of the sharing 
and lending activities taking place in a SE or CE setting occur in the digital world, where for 
instance digital copies of books, as well as objects (e.g. CAD files) are distributed. As such, 
interpreting the exhaustion principle so that only digital distribution of software is subject to 
exhaustion, while digital distribution of other digital object is not, is limited at the least. On the 
other hand, however, it is understandable to some extent that expanding the reach of exhaustion 
to cover any digital distribution of protected works, could pose an unbalanced situation in 
respect to the right holders. For instance, from the practical point of view, it can be argued that, 
unlike analogue/physical copies, in principle the digital copy of a work is not subject to any 
sort of appreciable degradation although digital copies as such can be altered in many ways.60 
Moreover, the issue of control of the work comes into play, as greater control can be exerted 
over the transmission of a physical copy, while with digital copies it is more difficult to make 
sure that the person to whom the work is transferred just keeps the original copy without 
creating a new one. However, many of these problems could be tacked by technological 
protection measures.61 In addition, it should also be noticed that on the one hand, the exhaustion 
of copyright only applies to the right of distribution and, on the other, services do not exhaust62 
- all this further limits possibilities for sharing, reusing and lending protected items. Indeed, 
these shortcomings are examples that, as with the case of patent rights, highlight the limitations 
of trying to channel environmental types of arguments indirectly and only via relying on 
exceptions and limitations to the exclusive rights.  
 
4.5. Trade Marks and Recycling 
An EU-wide trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods 
which have been put on the market in the European Economic Area under that trade mark by 
                                               
58 Mezei, Copyright Exhaustion, Law and Policy in the United States and the European Union, pp. 133–138. 
59 See for instance the definition provided by the European Commission on “Collaborative Economy”. Available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/services/collaborative-economy_en (accessed 31 May 2019). 
60 For a comparison arguing that the differences between material and digital markets justify the ban from digital 
exhaustion, see A. Wiebe, “The economic perspective: exhaustion in the digital age” in Global Copyright Three 
Hundred Years Since the Statue of Anne 1709 to Cyberspace (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010), pp. 321–328. 
61 For instance, Mezei suggests adoption of a system of unique ID-numbers inserted in the metadata of each 
digital file, combined with blockchain technology used for conclusion of smart contracts for digital sales. Mezei, 
Copyright Exhaustion, Law and Policy in the United States and the European Union, pp. 160–161. 
62 See for e.g. Report on the implementation and effects of Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of 
computer programs, COM(2000) 199 final 17; Follow-up to the Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights 
in the Information Society COM(96) 568 final, Ch. 2, 19, para 4; Database Directive art. 5(c). 
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the proprietor or with his consent.63 This notwithstanding, however, Art. 15(2) of the EU Trade 
Mark Regulation (TMR) and Art. 15(2) of the Trade Mark Directive (TMD) rule out exhaustion 
“where there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of 
the goods, especially where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have 
been put on the market”.  
In the context of trade mark, the example of so called ‘upcycling’ or ‘trashion’ cases is here 
used to demonstrate the possible problems in relation to the exhaustion principle and the acts 
of recycling protected goods. Upcycling refers to the creation of objects, such as bags or 
jewelleries, used as home-decorative purposes from used products.64 These products could 
extend the material´s lifespan and have a positive contribution to consumers´ attitudes towards 
recycling. In these cases a trade mark might be a key feature of a product for the consumer due 
to its attractiveness in completely different recycled products. In fact, a trade mark might in 
these cases serve as an indication of recycling, although this kind of function is a reflection of 
the origin function of the product utilised as raw material. Usually, when a trade mark has 
changed as a badge of recycling, the risk of confusion might be low despite the fact that the 
trade mark might form a prominent feature of the product.65 Using the original product´s trade 
mark in these “new” products might however be easily counted as trade mark infringement. 
The requirements for protection of trade marks with a reputation66 could be fulfilled, because 
this kind of utilisation could easily be claimed to include elements that mean, for instance, 
freeriding to some extent.67 Additionally, it is highly questionable whether any of the trademark 
limitations applies to these cases. The principle of exhaustion might not be applied to situations 
where, due to a stage of alteration, the identity of the original product has been turned into a 
new, independent product.68 However, even when the stage of alteration does not as such 
prevent exhaustion rule to be applied, a trademark holder might prevent further 
commercialisation of the product in the case of a ‘legitimate reason’ as meant in Article 15.2 
                                               
63 See TMD art. 15(1) and TMR art. 15(1). 
64 See eg, A. Anderson, “Trash or Treasure? Controlling your Brand in the Age of Upcycling” (2009) 129 
Trademark 1. 
65 More detailed T. Pihlajarinne, “Repairing and Re-using from an Exclusive Rights Perspective – Towards 
Sustainable Lifespan as Part of a New Normal?”. However, right holders might be suspicious of their trade mark 
being utilised, eg, see Anderson, “Trash or Treasure? Controlling your Brand in the Age of Upcycling” 1‒2, 
who argues the importance of reacting to this kind of use, eg, stating that in the case of a bag constructed only 
from cookie wrappers originating from a single trade mark holder, the prominent nature of the trade mark would 
lead a reasonable consumer to assume that the bag was produced by the trade mark holder or under its 
supervision. However, Anderson recognises that aggression towards this kind of trade mark utilisation might 
also result in ill-will associated with the trade mark holder as the trade mark holder could be seen as having little 
concern about the environmental impact of its products. 
66 See TMD art. 10(2) and TMR art. 8(5). 
67 Trade mark use must mean free-riding (use “takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character of repute” of 
trade mark) or tarnishing the trade mark’s reputation (use is “detrimental to repute” of trade mark) or dilutes the 
trademark (use is “detrimental to distinctive character” of trade mark). See the CJEU´s preliminary rulings for 
instance L´Oréal SA, Lancome parfums et beauté & Cie SNC and Laboratoire Garnier & Cie v. Bellure NV, 
Malaika Investments Ltd and Starion International Ltd (C-487/07) EU:C:2009:378; [2009]. 
68 About alterations in the context of German exhaustion doctrine, see for instance U. Hindebrandt, Marken und 
Andere Kennzeichen. Carl Heymanns Verlag (2006) pp. 299–301.  
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of the TMD, “especially where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they 
have been put on the market”.69  
When considering the application of the limitation in the Article 14(1)(b) of the TMD, 
according to which “A trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from 
using, in the course of trade [...] signs or indications which are not distinctive or which concern 
the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production 
of goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of goods or services”, it is 
noteworthy that the CJEU has stated in the Adam Opel v. Autec AG70 and the Adidas AG et al 
v. Marca Mode71 cases that only such use that indicates the characteristics of the products of 
the third party utilising a trade mark falls under the scope of this limitation. A trade mark, as 
an indication of origin, must directly relate to the characteristics of the goods placed on the 
market. Moreover, the CJEU explicitly stated in the Adidas case that the exploitation of a trade 
mark for a purely decorative purpose does not amount to such type of use.72 From this 
perspective, there is no certainty over whether in upcycling types of cases a trade mark would 
be considered as a decoration or whether it could be interpreted to indicate an origin of raw-
material. From this perspective, trade mark might even be perceived as an indication of 
recycling. In the latter cases, the use might fall under the limitation set by article 14(1)(b) of 
the TMD. 
4.6 Conclusions: challenges in implementing sustainability via exhaustion and related 
limitations 
The afore analysis shows that the exhaustion provision and related limitations to exclusive 
rights fail in recognising and implementing CE and SE ways of thinking for each of the IP 
exclusive rights discussed. In details there are differences among the various rights, but the 
common denominator is that the traditional interpretations of exhaustion provide right holders 
with an extensive right to control the products, while the space left to repairing activities and 
alterations is limited. The example of exhaustion and some other limitations show how the idea 
of strong property rights that prevail over other important societal values has taken the form of 
a ‘structural bias’ in our European IP system. Other values, such as sustainability, are 
diminished.   
 
5. The Step Forward: Embedding ‘Strong’ Sustainability into the Scope of Protection 
As the afore analysis explains, the current European IP law system, although including tools 
for possibly reflecting values like sustainability, does not make much use of such. Instead, 
                                               
69 About this problematic, see Viking Gas A/S v. Kosan Gas A/S (C-46/10) EU:C:2011:485; [2011]. 
70 See Adam Opel v. Autec AG (C-48/05) EU:C:2006:154; [2006]. 
71 See Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarambo, Adam Opel v. Autec (C-48/05) EU:C:2006:154; [2006]. 
72 For instance Kur criticizes the division between using a trademark as an element of a good or an element that 
indicates something on the good, A. Kur, “Small Cars, Big Problems?  – An analysis of the ECJ´s Opel./.Autec 
Decision and its consequences” in Festskrift till Marianne Levin (Stockholm: Norsteds Juridik, 2008), p. 343, 
pp. 329–352. 
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societal principles traditionally enter into the IPR room via the backdoor of the exceptions and 
limitations. On the one hand, this is untenable - ‘strong’ sustainability cannot be pursued if 
only considered as an exception to property rights. On the other, this analysis showed that the 
architecture of the existing system already includes tools for a ‘strong’ sustainability approach 
to prevail - this means that it is possible to actually combat climate change and loss of 
biodiversity, but we need to give the IP framework a new sense of purpose and make 
remarkable changes into its structures accordingly. Indeed, this requires a systematic change 
in the way we currently conceive and justify the existence of IP rights. Fostering sustainability 
needs to become as important a priority as it is to provide incentives to innovate. Unless 
sustainability is embedded as a core principle into these frameworks, and considered by 
businesses as important a target as incentives to innovate and profit, realistic paths for IP to 
foster ‘strong’ sustainability cannot be achieved.73 
In this context, key elements relate to the way we currently conceive ownership of intangibles, 
as well as how we interpret the scope and reach of protection and exclusive rights - in here we 
mostly focus on the latters. Notably, utilitarian theories justify protecting IP for the purpose of 
creating an incentive for innovative and creative activities: by awarding an exclusive right to 
the creator of an artistic work or the inventor of a technical innovation, the government provides 
the rightholder with inter alia the ability to hinder a competitor from utilizing that creation or 
invention. From an economic point of view, the rightholder obtains a temporary ‘monopoly’ 
limited in scope and enforceable for a specified period. In the discourse about finding an 
appropriate balance between protection and access, the role of IPR to cover R&D costs for 
innovating, as well as issues of efficiency and maximisation of profit, are prevalent - since the 
costs of creation are supposedly high, while the costs of copying and distributing lower, without 
IPR the production of innovations would not be efficient.74 
As Jaffe, Newell and Stavins explain, both the need for protecting IPRs and regulation that 
aims to protect the environment are results of market failures.75 Therefore, when considering 
sustainable innovations and creations (touched by both the aims of creating incentives to 
innovations and creations and aims to protect environment), the simultaneous existence of two 
sets of market failures significantly decreases the probability for the free market mechanism to 
                                               
73 See also An Open Letter to Greta Thunberg from a Gen-X Investment Banker (and a Plea for Working 
Together). Available at: https://medium.com/@sasjasocial/an-open-letter-to-greta-thunberg-from-a-gen-x-
investment-banker-and-a-plea-for-working-together-d3b299e5df73. See also L. Butler, “Property's Problem 
with Extremes” (2018). Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277500orhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3277500. 
74 For information about general theories for justifying IPR see: Hughes, “The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property” and W. Fisher, “Theories of Intellectual Property” in New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of 
Property (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 168. Available at: 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf (accessed 31st May 2019). See also John Locke, Two 
Treatises of Government, Sec. 27. 
75 A polluter derives benefit from polluting and the costs of polluting are paid by others. In the case of 
technology there is a reserved problem: as a starting point, a firm that invests to the technology creates benefits 
for others by the investing firm´s costs. See A. Jaffe, R. Newell and R. Stavins, “A tale of two market failures: 
Technology and environmental policy” in Intellectual Property, Innovation and the Environment (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2005), p. 225, p. 234, pp. 225–234. 
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work in a way that the outcome is socially optimal.76 Therefore, a careful weighing and 
balancing between the aims relating to protection of creative and innovative work and 
sustainability must be conducted, by integrating sustainability into the IPR system.  
The proprietary elements of IPR are safeguarded under the umbrella of fundamental rights to 
property, this way linking the way we conceive ‘ownership’ in intangibles to how such concept 
is understood in tangible property. Moreover, links to other fundamental rights, such as free 
speech and freedom to conduct a business, exist especially in relation to copyright and trade 
mark.77 Indeed, as mentioned above, the IPR regime entails both technological and social 
innovation, with the latter being largely intangible and having as its primary goal the value for 
society at large rather than the benefit for private stakeholders only. On the one hand, this 
means that, despite their exclusivity nature, IPR also imply ‘inclusion’, as well as ‘sharing’ and 
‘reusing’. On the other, and most importantly, all this indicates that the idea behind the IPRs 
already includes a space for important societal values, like sustainability, to be taken into 
account. In other words, lifting up sustainability as a major guiding principle in IP law would 
not distort this legal regime’s identity. Instead, it would actually reinforce it to better reflect 
up-to-date societal priorities. Concretely, embedding sustainability as one core principle of the 
IP regime, could open up several options for using the existing IP tools to foster ‘strong’ 
sustainability at all levels, including the level of exceptions and limitations, but also, and 
especially, at the stage of  protection and scope of exclusive rights, as well as enforcement.  
Amongst the possible doors this approach could open, for instance, at the level of granting of 
registered rights like patents and trade marks, additional incentives to sustainable types of 
innovations could be provided via including sustainability in the interpretation of concepts like 
ordre public, public policy and morality: inventions or signs that are considered as not 
sustainable should be banned from protection. Alternatively, a lighter option could be to 
include for instance stronger protection, longer duration, or quicker examination for sustainable 
innovations.78 At the same time, however, the IPR system should promote diffusion of 
sustainable innovations, as too high transaction costs can hinder the diffusion. The system 
should also recognise the need to support follow-up innovations.79 In this regard, concepts like 
the one of “inclusive patents” developed by Van Owervalle could provide with a feasible way 
to enable collaboration in innovating with other parties.80 
                                               
76 A. Jaffe, R. Newell and R. Stavins, “A tale of two market failures: Technology and environmental policy” p. 
234. 
77 See, for instance, Laurence R. Helfer and Graeme W. Austin, Human rights and Intellectual Property. 
Mapping the Global Interface, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
78 There are some precedents, e.g. in the case of rare diseases and orphan drugs. 
79 See P. S. Menell and S. M. Tran, “Introduction” in Intellectual Property, Innovation and the Environment 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), parts xi–xv. 
80 “Inclusive patents” refer to “a one-sided right geared to include rather than to exclude others, and 
encompasses as an attribute the right to enforce sharing behaviour and take non-sharing users to court. The 
inclusive patent is further conceived as a registration patent obtainable at low cost”. See G. Van Overwalle, 
“Inventing Inclusive Patents. From Old to New Open Innovation” in Kritika: Essays on Intellectual Property 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), Vol. 1, p. 206, pp. 206–277. Available at 
SSRN:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2705109. (accessed 31st May 2019). 
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The concept of sustainability should be used also to foster innovative ways to repair and recycle 
protected goods. In order to include the sustainable concept also in cases of non-literal 
infringement, an option could be to take the idea of a ‘sustainable’ lifespan as a core principle 
to consider within the scope of all the exclusive rights. 81 In that case, only acts that go beyond 
the genuine purpose of maximising the lifespan of a product would constitute an infringement. 
In context of product patents, for instance, this could mean to include in the doctrine of 
equivalents a condition according to which only those acts of making, using or selling that go 
beyond the purpose of maximising the lifespan of the patented product would be considered as 
patent infringements. In the trade mark context, this could mean that in cases where the ultimate 
focus of trade mark use is not on the badge of origin type of purpose and the use is considered 
feasible from the sustainable business model point of view, should be out of the scope of trade 
mark rights and, thus, not constitute infringement. This is based on the idea that a tendency to 
consider non-typical uses of a trade mark where a trade mark is perceived as something else as 
a badge or origin, as prima facie trade mark infringements, reflects a strong property right 
perspective. However, such utilisation does not directly interfere with the most essential 
function of the trademark, which is to guarantee the origin of goods and services. If such use 
is feasible from sustainability viewpoints, it should not be counted as infringement. Flexibilities 
under the rules conferring rights should be used also also to foster innovative ways to recycle.82 
In addition, the idea of sustainable lifespan could redirect utilisation of resources also in 
copyright and design law. In the context of design, the exclusive rights should only cover such 
making, offering, putting on the market, importing, exporting or using which main purpose is 
beyond that of to maximising the lifespan of the object protected by the design right. In 
copyright, by embedding the principle of sustainable lifespan into the economic rights, such as 
the reproduction right, the making available to the public and the distribution right, it would be 
possible to redirect incentives towards increasing utilisation of intangible copies instead of only 
tangible ones. Enabling wider possibilities to utilising digital copies, would allow a better 
realization of some of the visions sealed in both the SE and the CE, such as activities related to 
the lending, reusing and reselling of (protected) subject matters. Infringement activities, could 
then be construed in a similar way as in patent law. For example, the act of reproduction and 
distribution would be counted as copyright infringements only in cases that the main purpose 
of the act is not that of to maximising the lifespan of the tangible copy of work.  
                                               
81 Pihlajarinne has suggested this as a primary solution in contexts of patents and trademarks, see T. 
Pihlajarinne, “Repairing and Re-using from an Exclusive Rights Perspective – Towards Sustainable Lifespan as 
Part of a New Normal?”. As a secondary, first aid -type of option she suggested revisiting the “normal lifespan” 
idea in patent law. Instead a threshold of a ‘normal, sustainable lifespan for that particular category of product’, 
or an ‘environmentally-friendly lifespan’ could be applied. This would mean a transformation from the idea of 
what the lifespan of a product to an idea of what it should be, that is, how long the product should work in a 
sustainable-based society. This is, however, not be the best option since it is beyond correcting the ultimate 
problem which is the structural bias. T. Pihlajarinne, “Repairing and Re-using from an Exclusive Rights 
Perspective – Towards Sustainable Lifespan as Part of a New Normal?”.  
82 Trademark law has proved more flexible than, for instance, copyright law, in facing challenges caused by 
digitalization. For instance, such fundamental components of trademark law as principle of confusion and 
commercial use criterion have been under flexible interpretation when applied to trademark use in domain 
names and search engines using adware. See T. Pihlajarinne, “Non-traditional Trademark Infringements” pp. 
306–307. 
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All these are just examples that show that, on the one hand, embedding sustainability is in fact 
possible by making changes to the structures of existing IP frameworks and, on the other, that 
this is actually an important path that the legislator is to take should it really want to foster 
sustainable innovation and development via IPR.  
 
6. Conclusions 
As such, the general aims of the IP system contain room for respecting issues that are of utmost 
importance in society, such as environmental sustainability, in the innovation and ownership 
framework that it provides. For instance, fundamental theories of justification of IPR 
undoubtedly enable possibilities for reflecting environmental sustainability into the IP 
framework. As the sustainable innovations and creations are burdened by two sets of market 
failures, regulation is needed in order to redirect incentives. As our examples demonstrates, 
however, the problem lies in the existing fundamental structures of IPR, which reflects a strong 
property right perspective. The utmost important social values are channeled into the IPR 
system mainly via exceptions and limitations.  
A system that sees sustainability only as an exception to the main rule is untenable in nowadays 
society, where the environmental challenge constitutes one of the most important problems that 
developed countries need to tackle. On the contrary, incentives for promoting sustainable 
innovation and sustainable business models should be embedded directly into the provisions 
conferring exclusive rights, for instance by to implementing the idea of a ‘sustainable’ lifespan 
as a core principle to consider while defining the scope of all the IP rights, as here proposed. 
Certainly, structural biases in the European IP system is a problem that affects many other 
important values than sustainability. For instance, one could argue that free flow of information 
and privacy are both examples of important principles that are struggling to get enough 
attention via exceptions and limitations. However, because environmental sustainability is, in 
the end, a question of continuation of modern human life, it should be prioritised. 
 
